it is worth looking at his arguments in some detail. i. First ofall, continuing Harris's attack on the Nazi analogy, they point out that the Nazi euthanasia programme began with the desire to get rid of 'lebensunwerten Lebens' or lives unworthy of life. What the Nazis had in mind was getting rid oflives that would not contribute to the health ofthe 'Volk', that is, of the German race. Kuhse and Singer point out that this is different from its having started with the simple desire to get rid of handicapped people. They suggest that 'Since our society does not believe in any such entity (ie the "Volk"), there is no real prospect that allowing active euthanasia of severely handicapped new-born infants would lead to Nazi-style atrocities'. But the point of the Nazi analogy does not rest upon its being the case that we share the Nazi belief in what Kuhse and Singer refer to as '. . . that mysterious racial entity, the Volk'. In our pluralist, multicultural society with comparatively weak notions of nationalism and national pride, economic and aesthetic considerations might nevertheless push some people towards a slippery slope where some human beings are considered to be less valuable than others just because, for example, they do not contribute to the health or wealth of the other inhabitants of this country. The point of the Nazi analogy is not that we could get onto the slippery slope in question by the same route as the Nazis. Even if Kuhse and Singer were right about its being impossible that those who do not believe in 'that mysterious racial entity, "the Volk" ' could step, by their acceptance of active euthanasia of severely handicapped infants, onto a slippery slope to Nazistyle atrocities, at the same point as the Nazis, this does not mean that the step onto such a slippery slope could not be made at some other point. It does not matter whether the slippery slope began for the Nazis with the idea of purifying the race or with the idea of getting rid of the handicapped. It does not matter at what point the handicapped began to be considered 'lebensunwerten'; what matters is that they were killed as part of a programme of active euthanasia because, being handicapped, they were considered 'lebensunwerten'.
It is a characteristic of slopes, slippery or not, that their upper reaches are continuous with their lower reaches and that hence someone who steps onto a slippery slope half way down its length is just as likely to end up at the bottom as someone who steps on at the top. The use of the Nazi analogy is surely to draw attention to the possibility that since one step can lead to another, having once taken the decision that certain types of action are acceptable, there is some increased likelihood ofrelated actions being seen as permissible.
ii iii. Finally Kuhse and Singer refer to Clifford Grobstein's emphasis on the importance of our purposes. They write 'As long as our purposes are clearly spelt out, and we know how far we are willing to go, there is no reason to fear slippery slopes'.
This point echoes Harris's implication that having good motives somehow removes the slipperiness of the slope that legalising infanticide might involve setting foot upon. But good motives on the part of the architects of a programme of caring infanticide are not good enough. Those who advocate active euthanasia as a solution to the problem of what to do with severely handicapped infants may well have pure motives. They may well be certain of their purposes. But advocates of euthanasia, passive or active, for handicapped children are not saying that only they ofpure motives and clearly spelled out purposes, should be permitted to engage in this solution to the problems such children create. They are advocating the adoption of a policy of euthanasia which despite safeguards may well be put into practice by others with less high motives and less clear purposes. It is naive to imagine that such a policy would not be abused simply because those who were present at its conception and birth had pure motives and well spelled out purposes.
Conclusion
Whatever else they may have done, Kuhse and Singer have not demonstrated that Lorber's fear that legalising active euthanasia will involve setting foot on a slippery slope where the legal power to end the lives of handicapped babies may be '. . . abused by the unscrupulous', is unfounded. Harris has shown that if Lorber's fear is justified then he (Lorber) is already slithering and slipping on the feared slope.
I believe Lorber is right that there is a slope to be feared. And I believe that Harris is also right. Since, as he so elegantly puts it, '. . . selective non-treatment is a death dealing device', allowing babies to die and killing them are, all things being equal, morally equivalent and Lorber is already slithering and slipping, no matter how hard he tries to deny the fact. One could point out that his denial that he is on the feared slope amounts to self-deception and that selfdeception in itself makes the slope all the more slippery since deceiving oneself about the nature of one's enterprise might increase the likelihood that one will slip.
So I think there is a slippery slope. I think Lorber is on it. And I think it is to be feared. And yet I believe that it is a slope onto which we must step if we are not to allow ourselves to be guilty of causing unnecessary suffering to babies that will die whatever we do to help them. Kuhse, Singer, Harris and endless others have shown that killing and letting die are equivalent to one another. However, to have done this is not to have solved the problem raised by babies who are severely damaged or unwanted because they are less severely damaged. At root the problem concerns how we manage to ensure that when people, even doctors, act, they do so for the right reasons. Harris's suggestion is that making decisions to end the lives of such babies, whether they are described as 'killings ' Continuedfrom page 134
